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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE REPORT

OF THE GRAND JURY; PETITIONERS H. C. SHOEMAKER,
WILLIAM A. DAWSON, PHILO
T. FARNS\XrORTH, D. H. WHITTENBURG, HARLEY J. CORLEISSEN. and LAYTON MAXFIELD;
t1nd PROVO CITY, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Utah,

Case No. 7856

Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH, in the interest
of the GRAND JURY PRESENTMENT, otherwise referred to as the
UTAH COUNTY GRAND JURY
REPORT,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal arises from a memorandum decision (Rec.
81-89) by F. W. Keller, District Judge of the Seventh Judicial
District, filed with the county clerk of Utah County on April
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17, 1952, which expunged from the records of the District

Court of Utah County certain portions of a report of a Utah
County Grand Jury presented in open court on the first day
of December, 1951.
On August 8, 1951, a Grand Jury was duly drawn and
impaneled for Utah County (Rec. 5). This body of seven
citizens was duly charged by the court (Rec. 6-17) as to the
duties and responsibilities under the statutes of the state of
Utah. We quote this charge in part (Rec. 7):
Where, in the discharge of your statutory duties
as set forth in this charge, you find conditions worthy
of special comment by you, even though no indictment
may be found, it is your duty to report such conditions
to the Court so that proper public officers may have
an opportunity to correct undesirable or questionable ·
conditions, and so that the public of this County may
be informed as to the condition of health of their
government and administration.
After three and a half months of deliberation, the Grand
Jury in response to the charge of the Court presented a report
entitled, "Grand Jury Presentment," (Rec. 21) which was
signed individually by each of the grand jurors. This report
is made up of seven divisions. Division 1 deals with findings and
recommendations concerning Utah State Training School (Rec.
22) ; division 2 is composed of findings and recommendations
concerning the Utah State Hospital (Rec. 30); division 3 is composed of findings and recommendations concerning the operations of the State Road Commission in Utah County (Rec.
39) ; division 4 deals with the affairs of Utah County (Rec.
45); division 5 concerns the Alpine School District (Rec. 47);
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division 6, the findings and recommendations concerning law
enforcement in Provo City (Rec. 48); and division 7 concludes with general recommendations of the Grand Jury
(Rec. 51).
After the presentment had been preferred to the court
and made public, H. C. Shoemaker, William A. Dawson,
Philo T. Farnsworth, D. H. Whittenburg, Harley J. Corleissen and Layton Maxfield filed a petition to expunge the
grand jury report. In addition, a Motion to Expunge was
filed on behalf of Provo City. In each case, the motions were
supported by affidavits by those seeking expunction (Rec. 5473). In response to the aforementioned motions, a motion to
strike paragraphs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the petition of
H. C. Shoemaker, et al., and the affidavits in support thereof,
and part of paragraph 2 of the Provo City motion and the
affidavits of W. J. Farley and Clair M. Aldrich in support
thereof, was filed on behalf of the people of the state of Utah.
The matter was subsequently submitted to the Honorable F.
W. Keller, District Judge siting specially for the Fourth Judicial District. On April 15, 1952, the Honorable Judge Keller
rendered a memorandum decision, the effect of which was to
grant the Motion to Strike filed on behalf of the people of
the state of Utah and to expunge a part of the grand Jury
pr~sentment, as follows (Rec. 89) :
1. That portion thereof dealing with the American
Fork Training School and its administration under the
title, "Findings and Recommendations Concerning the
Utah State Training School.

2. That portion thereof dealing with the activities
of the State Road Commission in Utah County under
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the title, "Findings and Recommendations Concerning
the Operations of the State Road Commission in Utah
County.
Except as indicated in the two paragraphs next
above, the motion of the Commissioners to expunge
the entire report of the grand jury is denied.
I order expunged from the grand jury report all of
that portion thereof under the title, "Findings and
Recommendations With Respect to Law Enforcement
in Provo City," except paragraph three and the last
paragraph under that title.
From this decision this appeal is made.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

A GRAND JURY IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE A REPORT OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT
DOES NOT RETURN AN INDICTMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A GRAND JURY IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE A REPORT OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT
DOES NOT RETURN AN INDICTMENT.
· It is the view of appellant that this appeal raises one
question, viz., the power of a grand jury to make a report in
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the nature of a presentment without returning an indictment.
In other words, the power of a grand jury to make report of
conditions existing ·within public institutions and offices investigated by the grand jury and concerning which the grand
jury has received evidence, even though, in the opinion of
the grand jury, the evidence received does not warrant the
return of an indictment.
Appellant contends for the affirmative of this proposition
and respectfully submits that the common law and the law of
jurisdictions which proceed under statutes, which for all practical purposes are identical to those of the State of Utah, governing the deliberations and procedures of grand juries, support
appellant's position.
Appellant will discuss the law as it relates to this problem
under two principal heads, viz., the power of the grand jury
at common law, and the power of the grand jury under the
modern codes.
(A) At Common Law
It can be safely asserted that at common law the power
of a grand jury to make presentment was not confined to an
accusation of crime. Indeed, we find that the grand juries made
use of the presentment not only as an adjunct of criminal procedure, but made use of it as an essential part of the administration of the affairs of local government. See W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. X, pp. 146-151.
In discusing the use made of the presentment (Vol. X,
pp. 147-148) Holdsworth says, quoting in part from Webb,
The Parish and the County, 454:
7
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Some times these presentments took the form of
complaints that particular statutes had not been enforced by the justices and the other officials responsible for seeing to their observance. "In 1700 when
royal proclamations had vainly endeavoured to keep
down 'the excessive price of corn,' by fulminating
against forestalling and regrating, the Essex Grand
Jury drew attention to, 'the very great neglect of
several Constables in this County,' and incidentally·
to the remissness of the justices themselves in not making arrangements to insist on the licensing, according
to law, of 'badgers, jobbers, and drovers.'
The most important class of cases to which this procedure was applied was the class of cases concerned
with the maintenance of roads, bridges, gaols, and
other county buildings. Inhabitants were presented for
not repairing their highways; counties were presented
for not repairing bridges, gaols, or houses of correction; and disputes between different districts were
fought in proceedings initiated in this manner. So
normal was this procedure in these cases that it was
approved and encouraged by the Legislature. * * *
Again, at page 149, of the same volume:
This machinery of presentment, of which so much
use was made, had three good results. * * * In the
second place, it gave the inhabitants of the county,
who were chosen to serve on the grand jury, an opportunity of expressing their views upon the conduct of
the local government; and therefore it was a check
on the autocratic power of the justices.
In volume I of the same work, at page 322, we find fur·
ther comment:
The grand jury of modern times still retains some
traces of antiquity which have been lost to the other
8
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vanettes of the jury. They consider the evidence in
secret, and the court does not control or advise them
as to their findings in the individual cases which come
before them. It merely charges them generally as to
the nature of the business which they are about to
consider. They can always act if they please on their
own knowledge; and Holt tells us that they often so
acted at the end of the seventeenth century. They can
act at the present day in much the same way as they
acted in the thirteenth century.
From the foregoing account and the footnotes contained
in the cited text it becomes apparent that the presentment was
used without as well as in conjunction with indictments; and
when used alone it was for the purpose of calling the attention
of the crown and the local inhabitants to conditions for which
the officers of the local units of government were responsible.
Chancellor Kent, in speaking of the English common
law, says:

* * * It has proved to be a system replete with
vigorous and healthy principles, eminently conducive
to the growth of civil liberty; * * * . It is the common
jurisprudence of the United States, and was brought
with them as colonists from England, and established
here, so far as it was adapted to our institutions and
circumstances. Commentaries on American Law, by
James Kent, vol. 1, p. 343.
This, no doubt, is the same common law referred to in
People vs. Green, 1 Utah 11, 13, wherein the court was of
the opinion that the common law was most positively extended
over the Territory of Utah by the Congressional Act of September 9, 1850.
9
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Where not specifically restricted by statute the grand jury
functions with the same common law powers today as it did
at common law. O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N. J., M. 1, 50
A. 2nd 10, 20, 25.
In the early days of the Utah Territory ( 1863) we find
that a Federal Grand Jury considered it its duty to make public
note of the conduct of the Territorial Governor, Stephen S.
Harding. Tullidge, History of Salt L.1ke City, pp. 322, 323.
We quote in part the Presentment of Governor Harding:
Therefore, we the United States Grand Jury for the
Third Judicial District for the Territory of Utah, present his 'Excellency' Stephen S. Harding, Governor
of Utah, as we would an unsafe bridge over a dangerous
stream-jeopardizing the lives of all who pass over it,
or, as we would a pestiferous cesspool in our district,
breeding disease and death.
This presentment was spread upon the records of the court
in response to the request of the Grand Jury. Chief Justice
Kinney in discharging this jury said, in part:
I am well persuaded that in no spirit of malice or
undue prejudice have you been induced to call the
attention of the Court and people to what you regard
as the official misconduct of the Executive, but only
as the deliberate result of your investigations for the
public good. (Emphasis supplied).

Our statute 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 provides
as follows:
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent
10
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with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people
thereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.

By the plain words of the statute the common law of England becomes the rule of decision in all the courts of this state,
insofar as it is not in conflict with nor repugnant to the constitution and laws of this state and the United States.
We have seen that at the English Common Law it was a
settled practice for the grand jury to make public note of
discrepancies existing within the local organs of government;
further, that a Federal Grand Jury in territorial Utah found
it its duty to call public attention to the faults of the territorial
governor, and their action approved by the court in so doing.
Our constitutional provision, Article 1, § 13, provides in
part:

* * * The grand jury shall consist of seven persons,
five of whom must concur to find ail indictment; but
no grand jury shall be drawn or summoned unless in
the opinion of the ,judge of the district, public interest
demands it.
Certainly, the common law use of presentments is not repugnant to, nor in conflict with this section. That the statutes
of this state, as they relate to the functions of the grand jury,
are likewise free from conflict with the common law of England, is shown in the next succeeding subdivision of this
brief by judicial authority interpreting statutes identical to
our own. We think the constitution and laws of the state of
Utah are more in aid of the common law than in derogation
of it.
11
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Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that we cannot but
conclude that a grand jury, called in the state of Utah, has
common law authority, sanctioned by statute, to return a presentment in the nature of a report even though an indictment
docs not or cannot follow it.
(B) Under Utah Statutes
Chapter 19, Title 105, Utah Code Annotated, 194~, as
amended, defines the powers and duties of grand Junes in
Utah. Pertinent provisions of this chapter are herewith set
forth.
105-19-1, as amended by Chapter 13, § 1, Laws of 1947,
provides:
The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses
within the jurisdiction of the court committed or
triable within the county, and present them to the court
by indictment, or by an accusation in writing.
105-19-4.
The grand jury shall not be bound to hear evidence
for the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the
evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason
to believe that other evidence within their reach will
explain away the charge, they should order such evidence to be produced, and for that purpose may require
the prosecuting attorney to issue process for the witness.
105-19-7.
The grand jury must inquire into the case of every
person imprisoned in the jails of the county on a
criminal charge and not indicted or informed against;
into the conditions and management of the public
prisons within the county; and into the willful and
12
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corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every
description within the county.
105-19-8.
They shall also be entitled to free access at all
reasonable times to the public prisons, and to an examination without charge of all public records within
the county
Appellant finds no Utah case which resolves the question
at bar, nor any Utah case which interprets the provisions of
the statutes above quoted. However, the question raised in
this appeal has re!=eived judicial determination in jurisdictions
whose statutes, governing the functions of grand juries, are
in purpose and effect identical to our own. It is to be observed
that nowhere in Utah law, constitutional or statutory, is there
provision proscribing the use of a presentment in the nature
of a report.
We direct the court's attention to the law in the State of
California; and in doing so we set forth the following provisions of the Penal Code of California which are counterparts of those of the State of Utah set forth above.
Section 915.
The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses
committed or triable within the county, and present
them to the court by indictment.
Section 920.
The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence for
the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the
evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason
to believe that other evidence within their reach will
explain away the charge, they should order such evi-
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dence to be produced, and for that purpose may require
the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses.
Section 922.
If a member of a grand jury knows, or has reason to
believe, that a public offense, triable within the county,
has been committed, he must declare the same to his
fellow-jurors, who must thereupon investigate the same.

Section 923.
The grand jury must inquire into the case of every
person imprisoned in the jail of the county on a criminal charge and not indicted; into the condition and
management of the public prisons within the county;
and into the willful or corrupt misconduct in office
of public officers of every description within the county.
Sectiort 924.
They are also entitled to free access, at all reasonable
times, to the public prisons, and to the examination,
without charge, of all public records within the county.
Under these provisions the case of Irwin v. Murphy, 129
Cal. App. 713, 19 P2d 292 ( 1933), California District Court of
Appeals, was decided; (hearing denied by the Supreme Court
in April of the same year.) In that case an action of libel had
been filed against members of a grand jury for San Francisco
County, because the grand jury had returned a report to the
court condemning the local prize fight game as a "racket."
The report further stated that gambling cliques "and other
evil influences" dominated the boxing clubs; that the boxing
commissioner was unfit; that the testimony of a certain referee,
before the grand jury, was in conflict with other testimony;
that certain referees were selected as a money getting scheme.
14
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The report noted that the evidence received by the grand jury
justified these conclusions but did not warrant the return of
an indictment. In addition the grand jury made certain recommendations, among which were: that the Governor request
the resignation of the boxing commissioner, that the license of
Irwin, a referee, be perpetually revoked. The report was concluded with suggestions as to remedies to ameliorate these
conditions. This report was caused to be openly published by
the grand jury. After deciding the report was privileged, the
court specifically determined that the grand jury had not
exceeded its powers in returning a report without finding an
indictment, and at page 293, said:
In the Matter of Tyler, 64 Cal. 434, 437, 1 P. 884,
887, it was said: "A grand jury should never forget that
it sits as the great inquest between the state and the
citizen." From the foregoing it is manifest that a grand
jury is inherently a body of inquisition empowered to
make full and diligent inquiry into public offenses triable within the county. This idea is carried out in the
provisions of the Penal Code. Section 920 places the
duty of investigation with the grand jury, and demands
that this body not only hear and weigh incriminating
evidence, but that it shall hear evidence which it may
have reason to believe will explain or clear away any
pending charge. Section 922 again places upon the
grand jury the duty of investigating a charge where
any member has reason to believe that a public offense
has been committed.
The appellant concedes, as he must, the foregoing.
Thus conceding, he would limit any report of the grand
jury to an indictment, presentment, accusation, or an
express report ignoring the charge. In other words,
appellant argues that when the commission of a public

15
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offense is being inquired into or investigated the power
of the grand jury is limited to a definite charge,
whether by indictment or otherwise, against the person
being investigated; that if the grand jury does not find
sufficient evidence to indict, the power of the body
terminates and any act thereafter is in excess of jurisdiction. We think this too narrow a construction to
be placed upon the powers of a grand jury. As a matter
of routine, if nothing further, the power to investigate
includes as an integral part thereof the right and
duty to report the result of such investigation. The
duty of a grand jury is to protect the citizen against
unfounded accusation. Matter of Tyler, supra. Such
a duty, coupled with the power of investigation, almost demands completeness of disclosure on matters
investigated. It seems futile to attempt demonstration
of the obvious. Law and common sense combine to
compel the conclusion that, if a grand jury is authorized and bounden to inquire of public offense, a necessary element of this power must be the power and
duty to disclose the result of the inquiry.
This case stands today as the law in California, and it is
interesting to note that the court, while vigorously establishing
the right of a grand jury to make a report without returning an
indictment, does not limit the scope of such report to the
censure of public officers only, but approves the censure of
the erring private citizen as well.
The State of New York, it seems, has dealt with the question under consideration more than any other jurisdiction.
In this connection it is again to be observed that the statutes
of New York which pertain to grand juries provide for substantially the same procedure as do their counterparts in the
Utah Code. We set forth the pertinent provisions of the New
York Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure.
16
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Section 260.
The grand jury must inquire,
1. Into the case of every person imprisoned in the
jail of the county, on a criminal charge, and not indicted; and

2. Into the wilful and corrupt misconduct in office,
of public officers of every description, in the county.

3-. The grand jury may inquire into the condition and
management of the public prisons in the county.

Section 261.
They are also entitled to free access, at all reasonable times, to the public prisons, and to the examination
without charge, of all public records in the county.
The case of In Re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 16 N. Y.
Anno. Cas. 15, 19 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 59, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 181
N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226, ( 1905), dealt squarely with the point
here in issue. In that case, the grand jury, in the exercise of
its inquisitorial powers, made a "report or presentment" censuring public officials for the improper performance of their
duties, without indicting them. The public officials criticized
moved to expunge the report. The motion was denied. The
court interpreted the above quoted statutes and reasoned as
follows:
We may assume that these powers are conferred for
some purpose. Official inquiry intends either official
action or official report. As such powers are limited
to inquiry, and the grand jury has no executive or
administrative authority in the premises, the result of
any inquiry must be report or statement. which shall
call attention to the wrong. The grand Jury can but
report to the court to which it was returned, and by

17
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which it is discharged. Such reports are commonly
termed "presentments." * * *
I think, therefore, that any final finding upon the
exercise of these inquisitorial powers may be called
a presentment, and that it may be regarded as final,
and not improper, because an indictment cannot or
does not follow it. * * *
_Such inquiry as is required by sections 260 and 261
may reveal misconduct, inattention, or shortcomings
of public officials, and the report or presentment might
be colorless or ineffective unless it specified individual delinquencies. I think that in such a case the
grand jury can properly point out those individuals
who, as officials, are deemed responsible, and that
the presentment may stand though it be not followed by
an indictment. It may be pertinent to call attention
to the fact that inefficiency, carelessness, or neglect may
require correction, and yet not justify indictment, and
to the fact that not all willful or corrupt misconduct
in office can be presented in the first instance by
indictment; * * *
The decision in the Jones case (supra) remains the law
today in the state of New York, being the only case of its
kind, in that jurisdiction, decided by an appellate tribunal.
In addition, subsequent cases have affirmed this decision, the
most comprehensive of which is that of In Re Healy, 161
11isc. 582, 293 N.Y.S. 584, (1937), where all the New York
cases to that date, dealing with the question, are reviewed.
The years intervening between the Jones and Healy decisions produced six cases in which the New York County
Courts passed on motions to expunge grand jury presentments,
returned without indictments. The first of these was Re
Heferman, 125 N.Y. S. 737, (1909), where expunction
18
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was granted. The report here expunged recited no facts in
support of its criticism of certain borough officials. In 1910
the case of In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N.Y.S. 313, was
decided. In this case, the court found there had been no
evidence heard on which to base the presentment, and also
dceided that the conduct of the Attorney General, the subject
of the report, was not of sufficient general interest to warrant
the return of a presentment. Next came In re Woodbury,
155, N. Y. S. 851, (1915). The motion for expunction
was granted, but again on special facts. In passing on this
question the court, at page 853, said:

It is unnecessary, in my determination of this question, to decide whether "presentment" and "indictment" are synonymous. Much has been learnedly
written on this subject, and the weight of authority
still seems to be that the grand jury has a right to
make presentments, even though t,Qey be not followed
by an indictment; but the courts seem to be equally
emphatic in insisting that a presentment cannot be
used by the grand jury merely as a guise to accuse
and thereby compel a person to stand mute, if the
presentment would warrant an indictment so that the
accused might answer, and that when a presentment
is merely a guise used by the grand jury to accuse, the
presentment should be expunged from the record.
In 1925 the case of Re Crosby, 126 Misc. 250, 213· N.Y.S.
86, again held a grand jury authorized to make presentments,
but said such a right should be used with caution, and a presentment or report of a grand jury should present facts obtained as a result of inquiries authorized under Section 260,
New York Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure. The next
two cases reported before the decision in the Healy case (supra)
19
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were those of Re Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N.Y.S. 81,
(1929), and Re Wilcox, 153 Misc. 761, 276 N.Y.S. 117,
( 1934). Both of these cases were critical of the use of the
presentment, but it is submitted that the facts of each of
these cases would warrant decision under the doctrine laid
down in In re Jones (supra) .
In 193 7 a vigorous reaffirmation of the Jones decision
appears in the case of In re Healy, above cited.
In that case th grand jury had returned a report censuring
the vice-chairman of the Queens County Democratic Committee, who was not a public officer. Healy moved the court
to expunge the report from the record. The motion was granted
because Healy was a private person and not a public official.
The court explicitly sustains the use of presentments, and
comments on the soundness of the decision in the Jones case
(supra), as follows:
That there is some diversity of opinion among the
decisions is apparent. Numerically, the number of decisions which condemn the submission of presentments
far exceeds those which have sustained the use of presentments. As a matter of fact, as has been pointed out,
the only appellate court in our state which has passed
upon the question has sustained the use of presentments. Jones v. People, supra. Notwithstanding the
splendid, well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Woodward, I am inclined to believe that the
prevailing opinion expresses the intention of the Legislature when it formulated the provisions of section
260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that
section the grand jury must inquire, among other
things, into the condition and management of the
public prisons in the county. If the only result of inquiry
20
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with reference to the public prisons is limited to the
findings of an indictment or silence on the part of the
grand jury, then that suvdivision of section 260 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure will be almost valueless, but, if the view adopted by the court in Jones
v. People, supra, is to prevail, then very valuable and
salutary results may come from intelligent investigations by grand juries. Prison conditions may be deplorable due to overcrowding, lack of adequate sanitary facilities, the age of the buildings, and to many
other factors which may contribute to such conditions, yet in no such instance might the grand jury
be warranted in finding an indictment. Certain it is
with the passing of time all structures become obsolete. Education and a better understanding of criminology and penology may well authorize a grand
jury to submit a presentment urging the erection of
modern structures conducive to a better and more enlightened treatment of prisoners. It would be most
unfortunate if such valuable contributions resulting
from intelligent investigations expressly directed to
be made by our grand juries should be lost because
of the theory that a grand jury may not hand up a
presentment. So, also, it is entirely conceivable that
public officials, while not guilty of criminality, may
be found to be so lacking in understanding or appreciation of the duties which are part of their office
that a grand jury may be discharging a very high
form of public service if they report findings based
upon a fair, honest, and thorough investigation of
all the facts. Not long since a Queens county grand
jury conducted an investigation into certain charges
which were made with reference to the New York
Parental School. As a result of a careful and painstaking investigation, a presentment was submitted to this
court which did not criticize or censure any individual
or individuals, but it did boldly and fairly criticize the
conditions under which the institution was operated
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and did make certain recommendations relative to
the continuance of the operation of the school, or in
the event that such recommendations were not followed,
that the institution be closed. The result of that presentment is that the institution is no longer operated;
the taxpayers of the city of New York will be saved
millions of dollars; and the great investment which
the taxpayers have in the land and buildings will be
placed to some beneficial use.
The advantages to the people of the state in giving
power to our grand juries to investigate in accordance
with the provisions of section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure far outweigh any consideration for the
feelings of public officials who may be criticized by
such grand juries. The caliber of the membership of
the grand juries is a matter which lies within the
control of the courts. The selection of men of experience, of integrity, of high citizenship, of courage,
of honesty, and with a reputation for fair dealing,
is a problem easily solved by those whose privilege
and duty it is to select and determine the membership
of our grand juries. And it is only fair to assume that
grand juries so selected will confine their presentments to matters which are properly subject to their
consideration. Under the law of our state there is
always available to the grand juries sitting at any
term of court the advice of the district attorney and of
the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of
the County Court.
Long ago it was said that "public office is a public
trust." Any public official should at all times be willing to render promptly an account of such trusteeship.
No matter what his office may be, he is but the servant
of the people, and in accepting such office he must
be presumed to know that his acts in office are subject
to the scrutiny provided by section 260 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. If he administers his .office
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with a high regard for the trust which has been placed
upon him by those who elected or appointed him,
then he need have no concern about investigation; if
he fails the trust, then, of course, he should have no
complaint if the interests of the people are best served
by disclosing his failure to fulfill the responsibilities
and obligations of the office which he has assumed.
Two later cases appear in New York sustaining the doctrine laid down in th Jones and Healy cases. In People v.
Doe, 176 Misc. 943,29 N.Y.S. (2d) 648, (1941), the court
had occasion to define the power of a. grand jury and, at page
650, said:
The right of a grand jury to hand up a presentment
involving the conduct of public officers in the discharge of their official duties was approved by the
Appellate Division in Matter of Jones v. People, 101
App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.S. 275, and was considered
by this Court in Matter of Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293
N.Y.S. 584, in which it was held that such presentments are limited to the acts of public officials, and
may not be used against private individuals. It must
- be presumed that the Grand Jury and the attorney
general will be guided in their acts by these decisions.
That same year a Grand Jury of New York County investigated certain charges publicized by Knight, an attorney,
and found them baseless and returned no bill. In what amounted to a presentment the grand jury requested transmission of
the minutes to the presiding judge of the appellate division
"for appropriate action against Knight." Applicant moved to
quash the presentment. The motion was denied. Application
of Knight, 176 Misc. 635, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 353. In doing so
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the court, at page 3 56, sustained the grand jury's right to make
a presentment, saying:
No one may validly press the argument that a grand
jury does not have the right to communicate its findings in an appropriate case to the proper authority
charged with a duty in connection with the matter
reported. It might be more correct to say that the grand
jury had a duty in such a case rather than a right. * * *
The petitioner deems the report to be a "wholly false
and libelous document" and states in his petition that
its continued presence in the files of this court constitutes a violation of his rights. The petitioner's
opinion of the action taken by the grand jury cannot·
be the criterion in the court's determination.
It is worthy of note that the presentments under consideration by the New York County Courts during the thirty-four
years separating the Jones and Healy decisions (supra) were
expunged because they were largely philosophical dissertations
against sin without basis in evidentiary fact, and in In re Woodbury (supra), the presentment was procedurally defective
in that it was not signed by the whole of the grand jury.
In other jurisdictions we find decisions critical of the presentment, but these, we think, are distinguishable from the
cases in New York and California, and the case instantly at
issue, either on statutory grounds or because of their interpretation of the common law. It remains, therefore, because
of the distinct similarity between the New York, California,
and Utah statutes, and the effect of the decisions of New York
and California interpreting such statutes, that these decisions
are more in consonance with what the effect of the Utah law
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is than are decisions from jurisdictions where differences in
the statutes or in the interpretation of the common law exist.
Poston vs. Washington, Alexandria & Mt. Vernon Ry.
Co., 36 App. D.C.359, 3-2 L.R.A. (NS) 785 ( 1911), was a
libel case wherein a presentment against a private citizen was
expunged. This case was decided under the provisions of
Pollard's Code of the Laws of Virginia wherein Section 3983
specifically limits the use of the presentment. We quote that
section in toto:
The grand jury shall inquire of and present all
felonies, misdemeanors, and violations of penal laws,
committed within the jurisdiction of the respective
courts wherein they are sworn; except that no presentment shall be made of a matter for which there
is no corporal punishment, but only a fine, where the
fine is limited to an amount not exceeding five dollars.
In State vs. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 ( 1932),
a presentment was expunged, but the court there proceeded
under statutes wholly unlike our own and reached its deciison on the basis of an interpretation of the common law,
which interpretation appellant thinks was misleading, because
it was too restrictive in scope.
In re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, 152 Md.
616, 137 A. 370 (1927), was a case where the Maryland court
expunged a presentment which it found to be but a censure
of public officials, and also proceeded on the premise (which
appellant submits was erroneous) that the presentment was
unknown at common law, except as an instrument to initiate
prosecution for crime.
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Four other cases which denounce the use of the presentment are Coons vs. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N.E. 194,
( 1922), In re Grand Jury Report, 204 Wise. 409, 235 N.W.
789 ( 1931), Rector vs. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 ( 1860), and Bennett vs. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183, Mich. 200, 150 N.W.
141, ( 1914). In the Bennett case, the court found there were
but two matters upon which a grand jury could return a presentment, viz., trespass on public lands and violation of the
election laws. Because of the differences heretofore mentioned,
appellant submits that these seven cases are without pertinence
to the Utah County Grand Jury Presentment.
(C) The Utah County Grand Jury Presentment
This document, preferred to the court after three and onehalf months of taking testimony, investigations and deliberations, in itself is a testimony to the conscientious and honorable
manner in which the grand jury did acquit the duties devolved
upon it by law.
In the instance of each institution, made a subject of the
report, the grand jury made no statements except such as were
based on facts disclosed as a result of their investigations and ~
the testimony received of sworn witnesses. Appellant believes
this fact to be apparent from a mere reading of the report.
The report is not composed of irresponsible claims, calumny,
nor even of merely well-meaning philosophical observations.
It is respectfully submitted that this is not the kind of document which, "under the guise of a presentment," is used as an
improper means to make accusation, or to ridicule the public
servant.
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In addressing itself to the Utah State Training School at
American Fork, the grand jury reported the existence of unsanitary conditions, overcrowded dormitories, "dirty and disorderly conditions prevailing in the kitchen, the barbershop,
the storerooms, the maintenance shop, the dairy colony and
the farm colony, which no alert and efficient administration
would tolerate." (Rec. 23). The grand jury further found
evidence of drunkenness of employees while on the job, a
practice at the school of employees taking the feebleminded
girls for rides at night, no inventory or control of the supplies
at the school, and that from the failure to keep a controlled
inventory, the state had suffered the loss of $700.00 in supplies, that only a feeble effort had been made to rectify this
condition, but at the time of the report, the system was wholly
inadequate. Certainly, not the least important of these conditions is the following: (Rec. 2 7)

* * * We have heard convincing proof of punishment of feebleminded children by incarcerating them
in a bare room at the school where they are left for
hours without food and care.
The attention of the Public Welfare Commission was
directed to these conditions among others, and nine objective
and constructive recommendations were made which, if followed, would rectify the deficiencies existing at this institution.
Those parts of the report which concern the activities
of the State Road Commision in Utah County and law enforcement in Provo City are set forth in the same objective
spirit, and are likewise bolstered by facts found after pains27
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taking investigation and conscientious interrogation of sworn
witnesses. In each of these instances the attention of the
proper officers and governing body is directed to the conditions enumerated, and recommendations are made for their
correction.
Should the conditions encompassed in this presentment
t;o unnoticed? Should the people and the heads of their government not be apprised of maladministration in administrative agencies? As a matter of public record, it is observed that
the three grand juries called in Salt Lake County over the last
twenty-five years have considered it their right and duty to
present to the public a report of their investigations. In this
day of vast administrative machinery in government, where
abuses and maladministration may creep in and remain for
periods of time without notice, the need for the inquisitorial
powers of a body of citizens composing a grand jury, and the
right to make public note of the results of their investigations,
certainly is as important as it was in common-law days. At
common law, it was this instrument of presentment which
was used for the precise purpose of calling the attention of the
crown and the citizenry to failures in law enforcement and
maladministration in local government. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law, supra. At common law names were named
and public officials were called to account. In this respect, it
is interesting to note that throughout the entire presentment
of the Utah County Grand Jury not one individual name is
used. Even if the Utah County Grand Jury had seen fit to make
individual references, the cases of In re Jones and Irwin vs.
Murphy (supra) would have sustained their right to do so. ,~
'l
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The sage observation of Justice Terrell, of the Florida
Supreme Court, in the case of In re Report of Grand Jury, 152
Fla. 154, 11 So. 2nd 316 (1934), at page 319, is illustrative
of the point.
Every person who assumes the duties of public office
does so with the knowledge that his official conduct
is constantly under scrutiny by the public. For the
purpose of detecting abuses of the trust so imposed,
the law has erected what may be termed a three way
switch, one of which leads to the Governor's office,
one to the grand jury room, and one to the primary.
Rectitude of official conduct is the only refuge from a
plethora of light from these sources. At any rate, it is
idle for one to think that he can administer the affairs
of his office with one strabismic eye on the grand jury
and the Governor and the other in pursuit of a course
of conduct contrary to public morals. Public office is
the most important trust demo~ratic government vests
in the citizen. It is important because the integrity
level of the political unit rises and falls with that of
its official leadership. The honest officer is not averse
to having the light turned on and if he objects, there
arises a shadow of suspicion that may prompt a grand
jury inquisition.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that an analysis of the
English Common Law supports the fact that the grand jury
grew up with vast inquisitorial powers and that the necessary
adjunct of those powers was the right and duty to make report
of the results of its inquisitions. Further, that the presentment
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we1s not, and is not, an instrument to be used only for the
accusation of crime.
It is also submitted that the effect of the Utah statutes,
pertaining to grand juries, is the same as that given their
counterparts, by respectable authority, in other jurisdictions.
Appellant believes that a determination of the legal and
social considerations involved in this problem leads to the
affirmation of the right and duty of a grand jury to make
a presentment in the nature of a report of its investigations,
even though an indictment does not or cannot follow.
Therefore, it is asked that this court reverse the decision
of the lower court and remit these proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN,
Assistant Attorney General
GEORGE S. BALLIF,
District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellant
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